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Abstract
This study examines the effect of intercity transportation and communications infrastructure
on urban concentration on a sample of 84 countries between the years 1960 and 2010. By
comparing the effects of interregional transportation and communications infrastructure on
primacy and urbanization, I find that (1) such investments promote population lspersion
amongst connected areas and (2) population concentration from unconnected locations into
connected ones. Therefore, intercity transportation and communications infrastructure is
only effective at reducing excessive concentration when the lspersion effect exceeds the
concentration effect.
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1. Introduction
The increase in the level of urbanization worldwide over the past century is
unstoppable, from a 13% of the world's population living in urban areas in 1900 to over a
50% in 2006 (United Nations World Urbanization Prospects, 2005; Cohen 2005). For the
first time in history, most people in the world live in cities or towns, and if thts trend
continues, in 2050 the urban population d reach a remarkable 70% (United Nations World
Urbanization Prospects, 2005). T h s relentless trend towards urbanization has been
commonly referred to as the arrival of the "urban d e n n i u m " (United Nations World
Urbanization Prospects, 2005). Such rapid urban growth is fundamentally driven by the
transformation of countries' economies from agricultural activities into increasingly
industrial and service-based activities, whch are much more efficient in close spatial
proximity (Davis and Henderson, 2003). However, agglomeration of economic activity
increases efficiency only to a degree, because at some point the costs of htgher rental prices
and congestion in high-density locations outweigh the benefits of low transportation costs
(Davis and Henderson, 2003).
The urban economics literature finds that there is a systematic tendency across
countries to underestimate the costs of agglomeration, which leads to excessive
concentration in large urban areas, particularly in the largest city (Ades and Glaeser, 1995;
Henderson & Becker, 2000; Duranton and Puga, 2003; Davis and Henderson, 2003;
Henderson 2004a). Stucltes also find that the negative effects of such overconcentration are
sipficant, l e a b g to large losses in productivity and economic growth rates (Henderson,
1999a; Henderson 2003). In light of these serious consequences, fmdmg effective policy
instruments to reduce congestion has become a central question in the urban economics
literature. Previous research suggest that investment in ITCI, that is intercity transportation

and communications infrastructure, might be the solution to tlvs problem, as it makes
locations with smaller populations more competitive (Wdhamson, 1965; Wheaton and
Shishido 1981; Lee, 1997; Henderson, Kuncoro, Nasution, 1996; Henderson 1999a, Davis
and Henderson 2003). However, in spite of such widely documented dispersion effect, as
countries expand their interregonal transportation networks, concentration in urban areas
continues to rise. The purpose of this paper is to explain the causes of such paradox, in
order to provide further information on what policies are effective at reducing
concentration.

2. Literature Review
Transportation and communications infrastructure networks induce changes in the
population dstribution because they affect the ratio of economies and dseconomies of
agglomeration, that is, the benefits and costs to economic agents, primarily firms, of locating
in areas with large populations (Henderson, Kuncoro, Nasution, 1996; Henderson 1999a;
Henderson, Lee & Lee 2001, Davis & Henderson, 2003). Specifically, ITCI reduce the
benefits of concentration, whch originate in the savings of transportation and
communication costs over space, and make spatial proximity advantageous. The literature on
economies of agglomeration identifies four main advantages to economic agents of locating
in populated areas. First, firms benefit from knowledge spdlovers, such as shared
information regardmg production techniques, suppliers, customers, market condtions etc.
(Marshall, 1890,Jacobs 1969). Second, both firms and workers benefit from low
transportation costs; producers minimize transportation costs of goods by having a large
population nearby and workers minimize commuting costs by living in the same city where
fums are located. In turn, the hgher dversity of industries and specialized employees in
populated areas produces a thud benefit, whch is that labor markets hnction better (Helsley

& Strange 1990; I h g m a n 1991). T h s not only means that there is better matclung between

fums and workers, but also that producers are more efficient by having access to the services
they might need from firms in other industries, such as fmancial, advertising and legal
services, suppliers etc. (Dixit & Stiglitz 1977; Rahman & Fujita 1990).
In spite of these important benefits, economic activity does not converge to a single
location. T h s is because in addition to economies of agglomeration, there are at least three
&saggregating forces or Qseconomies of agglomeration. First, as cities become larger, wages
and especially rent become increasingly costly due to the scarcity of land and firmsy
competition for workers (Henderson 1999a). Second, the h u t s in technical slulls to manage
megacities create congestion, resulting in severe problems of pollution and long commuting
costs for workers (Wheaton & Shishdo, 1981; Henderson 1999a; Accetturo, 2008).
Henderson (1999b) shows in a study of 100 cities of 15-20 Qfferent countries that if the
population of urban areas increases from 25,000 to 2.5 d o n , the costs of rent and
commuting increase by 115%. Finally, the high cost of living and lower quality of life offsets
some of the benefits of hgher wages in cities, which reduces the firms' competitiveness in
attracting the most qualified workers (Muth 1969; Fujita & Owaga 1982).
The location decision of economic agents depends on whether a location's
economies of agglomeration are greater or smaller tlian their diseconomies of agglomeration.
In other words, when the benefits of a large population outweigh the costs, it is efficient for
economic agents to concentrate in a populated area. Once the costs derived of a large size
equal its benefits, no further concentration is efficient. What the urban economics literature
finds, however, is that economic agents systematically locate in large cities well beyond the
optimal level of concentration, a phenomenon known as "urban bias" (Ades & Glaeser,
1995; Henderson 1999a, Henderson 2003). There are two primary causes of urban bias.

First, whereas a reduction in transportation costs can be easily estimated, congestion and
pollution are unpriced or underpriced negative externalities (Henderson, 2004). Such
negative externalities increase with population; hence they are comparatively more
underpriced in large cities than in small towns. Second, decision-makers are
disproportionately located in large urban areas and have greater awareness of investment
opportunities in those cities than in other locations (Henderson, 1998; Ades and Glaeser
1995). In addition, they have an incentive to increase living standards in the cities where they
live rather than other areas. As a result, resources tend to be excessively centralized in large
cities. The consensus in the urban economics literature is that the losses in productivity
derived from inefficiently large cities are substantial (Henderson 1999a; Henderson 2003).
Henderson (1999a) found that such losses can reach up to 1.5 annual percentage points of
economic growth, an effect sxndar in m a p t u d e to having significantly deficient investments
in human and physical capital (Henderson, 2004a).
The urban economics literature finds that investment in transportation and
telecommunication infrastructure is the key policy instrument to reduce excessive
concentration, as ITCI reduces the benefits of agglomeration and makes hmterland locations
more competitive. Indeed, when economic agents can transport goods and obtain
information at low cost without the need of close spatial proximity, agglomeration is less
beneficial; especially considering that there are also costs in concentration. Research in
urban economics supports tlus theoretical prelction. There have been lfferent approaches
to the study of transportation and communications infrastructure and urban concentration.
Some have s t u l e d t h s relationship more indnectly, by lookmg at the connection between
economic development, measured in GDP per capita, and agglomeration (Wdhamson, 1965;
Wheaton 81 Shishdo, 1981; Parr 1985; Hansen, 1990, El-Shakhs 1992). They find that at

early stages of development countries can only invest in public infrastructure in a few large
cities, and conserve on spendmg that would instead be allocated to connect cities or create
new cities. However, at later stages of development, countries can invest in transportation
and communications infrastructure, whch allows small and medium-sized cities to become
more competitive. T h s process drives decentralization.
Other studies look at the relationshp between transportation and communications
infrastructure and urban concentration more directly. Henderson, Icuncoro, Nasution (1996)
studied the effect of the development of major road networks from Jakarta to Bobatek,
Bekasi and Tangerand (known together as Jabotabek) in Indonesia. The study found that,
after the investment in the road network, Jakarta's share of employment in the
manufacturing sector dropped drastically, from a 5'7'/0 in 1986 to 44% in 1991, and that
employment moved to the cities that were connected to Jakarta through the road network.
Sldarly, Henderson, Lee & Lee (2001) found that Korea's large investment in
telecommunications since the late 1970s was followed by very rapid interregonal
convergence in competitiveness, which generated decentralization from Seoul to other
smaller cities. Finally, Henderson (199921) conducted a panel study from 1965 to 1995 for
about 80 countries on the effect of transportation infrastructure on urban concentration. In
line with previous studies, he found that increasing road and telephone h e density networks
has a significant effect in reducing concentration. Thus the conclusion from the all the
research on h s subject for the past four decades is clear: Investment in ITCI produces
population dispersion.
In spite of the diversity of approaches in this research, there is one more aspect that
is common to all of these studies: they all use primacy, or the largest city's share of the urban
population, as a measure of concentration. The reason for t h s common choice is that what

has consequences for economic growth and quality of life is not urbanization per se, but the
form that urbanization takes (Davis and Henderson, 2003; Henderson 2003). In other
words, there is no evidence that concentration of the population in urban or rural areas
affects economic growth rates, what affects growth rates is whether the population in cities
is clustered in one or a few excessively concentrated urban areas as opposed to a system of
medlum-sized efficient cities. Therefore, it makes sense to study problems of
overconcentration by loolung at how policies affect the concentration of a large oversized
city with respect to the rest.
However, there are at least two reasons why only using primacy to study the effects
of policies on concentration is sipficantly h t i n g . First, many countries have multiple
large centers where a significant part of the population is concentrated. Examples include
Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan and Hong Kong in Chma, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San
Diego in California, Sydney and Melbourne in Australia, or Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia
in Spain. As a result, restricting the study of excessive concentration to one city ignores the
problems of overpopulation that other cities might have. Even if the population
decentralizes from the largest city, if the recipients of such reduced populations are other
oversized cities, productivity losses wdl persist. The second reason why using primacy is
considerably lrrmting is that transportation and communications infrastructure do not
connect all locations equally (Wdhamson, 1965, Wheaton & Shshdo, 1981; IGugman, 1996,
Henderson 2004a; Henderson 2004b). Indeed, the h g h costs involved in large infrastructure
projects means that such projects wdl be more profitable to connect large cities, where there
are greater economies of scale. If these investments reduce the cost of access to other
markets, locauons where there are a greater proportion of such investments should become
relatively more competitive than locations where there are a smaller proportion of those

investments. As a result, the dispersion effect of ITCI should happen amongst connected
locations, and there should be a concentration effect from the unconnected locations into
the connected ones.
Since primacy only considers the ratio of the population in the largest city with
respect to other populated and connected areas, using k s measure should only show the
dispersion effect of transportation infrastructure. In order to make the concentration effect
of transportation infrastructure visible, a variable that separates between a set of better and
worse connected locations is needed. Hence, in t h s study I will compare the effect of
transportation infrastructure on both primacy and urbanization, as urban areas are
comparatively better connected than rural areas (Wdhamson, 1965, Wheaton & Shishido,
1981; IGugrnan, 1996, Henderson 2004a; Henderson 2004b). If there were just a dispersion
effect, increases in investments in transportation and communica~onsinfrastructure should
reduce both primacy and urbanization, as they are both measures of concentration.
However, I hypothesize that interregional transportation infrastructure wdl reduce primacy
and at the same time increase urbanization. In other words, we should see a dispersion effect
from the largest city to other connected locations and a concentration effect from less well
connected rural locations into better-connected urban ones. The rationale for using the
urbanization variable is thus not to study changes in urbanizationper .re, but to examine
whether transportation infrastructure produces concentration in larger cities that that have
greater economies of scale. The existence of such economic force would have implications
that are duectly relevant to the form that urbanization takes, that is, whether the population
in cities is hghly concentrated in a few areas or more evenly spread over various mediumsized centers.

2. Theory

2.1. Main Assumptions
In this section, I create a model for understandmg the economic forces behmd
population Istribution, based on the fmdmgs of previous literature and the new insights this
paper brings. I begin from the assumption that the concentration of natural resources and
quality of living conItions are unequally lstributed in space, whch causes some areas to
attract a greater amount of economic activity and population than others in the first place.
The second main assumption is that Ifferent types of economic activity are dependant on
location to lfferent degrees. For example, activities such as agriculture or mining can only
take place in certain locations, whereas manufacturing and services are usually much less
constrained by proximity to a parucular set of resources or geographc conltions. The thrrd
assumption I make is that when location is a choice, economic agents, f m s and workers,
seek to establish themselves in areas where they can maximize profit or income, respectively.

A key way in whch location can be a factor for profit-maximization is by minimizing
transportation and communication costs. For example, lower transportation costs allows
firms to deliver their products or services to customers faster and at a lower transaction cost.
Adltionally, workers can have a greater lsposable income by spendmg less time and money
on commuting costs. Finally, lower communication costs allows firms to exchange ideas and
obtain more efficient production techniques more easily, whlch increases the margnal
productivity of labor.

2.2. Economies and Diseconomies of Ac~lomeration& Optimal Population
The economics geography literature states that due to these important benefits
derived from low transportation and communication costs, spatial proximity is desirable.
This implies that location-independent economic activity is more efficient in more populated
locations, as economic agents we able to interact with one another without having to incur
in high intercity transportation costs. These benefits derived from city size, or economies of
agglomeration, increase exponentially, since when an economic agent locates in a given area,
it lowers transportation and communication costs to all other economic agents in that
location. Because of that, the benefits of city size are self-reinforcing; that is, when an
economic agent move into a particular location the incentive for others to move as well
increases. However, just as increases in city size generates benefits it also creates costs or
diseconomies of agglomeration. T h s is because as a city grows in population, it also tends to
grow in size, thus increasing the intra-city transportation costs. In addtion, more firms
compete for workers and the same scarce land, whch increases rental prices. As with
economies of agglomeration, the costs associated to city size also increase exponentially,
because whenever an economic agent locates in a given area, it also raises commuting, rental
and labor costs for everyone else.
It is important to stress the dfference in exponential growth pattern between the
economies and Qseconomies of agglomeration. Accordmg to the economics geography
literature, the exponential growth in economies of agglomeration is initially much greater
than the exponential growth in Qseconomies of agglomeration (Henderson, 1999a;
Henderson 2003). As a result, up to a certain point, there is an increasing dvergence
between the slopes of the economies and diseconomies of agglomeration curves, and
concentration is increasingly more efficient. However, once a p e n location has become

very large, the costs of agglomeration increase much faster than the benefits, and the slopes
of economies and Qseconomies of agglomeration are increasingly convergent. The equations
for economies and Qseconomies of agglomeration for a given city A can thus be expressed
as:

where

mAand DAA are economies and Qseconomies of agglomeration for city A ,

respectively, and NArepresents the population of city A. The term 6 on the equation for
economies of agglomeration is a value between 0 and 1 that inQcates the extent to which
the economic activity in a gven location A is location independent, with 0 being completely
location dependent and thus having no economies of agglomeration, and 1 being fully
location independent, and thus having large economies of agglomeration'. The other terms
in the equation capture the relationshp of initial dvergence and later convergence of the
economies and Qseconomies of agglomeration curves. First, in order for the slope of EAA
to initially exceed the slope of DA, we assume that a > p. In order for DA, to exceed the
slope of EA, at some point we assume that the exponents on the population term NA areQ

= I, whereas P > I. In adQtion, in order to insure that the slope of DA, surpasses the slope
of E f l , only at h g h values of NA,we assume that (a- p) >

>-a.In other words, the

Qfference in the bases of the equations exceed the dfference in the exponents on the
population term NA. I show these relationshps in the following set of graphs:

1

Broadly, the literature on this subject assumes that economies of agglomeration primady exist for
manufacturing and services, and to a much lesser extent for agriculture, which is much a more
location dependent type of economic activity (Henderson 1998; Henderson 2003; Davis &
Henderson, 2003).

Figure 1: Economies and Diseconomies of Agglomeration
& O ~ t i m aPopulation
l

As the graph shows, the economies and diseconomies of agglomeration curves are initially
increasingly divergmg and at some point become increasingly convergent. The graphs also
show that the optimaIpopdationfor a city occurs at the point where the m a r p a l economies
of agglomeration MEAA equal the m a r p a l diseconomies of agglomeration MDAA, that is
when the marginal net economies of agglomeration M N E f l , equal zero such that:
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However, the relevant question in urban economics is not optimal population but
optimal concentration. Indeed, even if a city stdl has marginal economies of agglomeration that
exceed its margnal dseconomies of agglomeration, economic activity will be more efficient
if it is located in an area with an even greater dfference between its marginal economies and
Qseconomies of agglomeration. Slrmlarly, even if a city's marginal dseconomies of
agglomeration exceed its margmal economies in a series of cities, productivity loses d be
minimized if economic activity is located in that city in whlch marginal costs of
agglomeration surpass the marginal benefits by the smallest dfference. Hence, the optimal
concentration of a city A depends on its relative marginal economies and Qseconomies of
agglomeration M E A , , and MDAA,. For simplifying purposes, let us consider a counuy
which population is composed of only two cities, city A and city B. The optimal
concentration of city A is thus gven by:
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2.3. The Problem of Excessive Concentration
If we assume that the economic activity of city A is more independent of location
than the economic activity of city B, such that 6, >

G, then city A should reach a htgher

population than city B, such that N, > N, unul the point at which the relative net marginal
economies of agglomeration M N U , , equals zero. Indeed, if governments and economic
agents correctly estimated economies and dseconomies of agglomeration, all locations
would always have efficient sizes. However, econometric studes show that there is a
systematic trend for economic agents to underestimate dseconomies of agglomeration,
which leads to a systematic overpopulation of the largest cities (Ades & Glaeser, 1995;
Henderson 1999a: Henderson 2003). There are two main reasons for the systematic
underestimation of dseconomies of agglomeration.
First, congestion and pollution are negative externalities that are unpriced or
underserpriced and that are much higher in more populated areas, hence they are
comparatively much more underpriced in large cities (Henderson, 2004a). Second, decisionmakers tend to be dsprop~rtionatel~
located in the larger locations and they are better
informed of opportunities for investments in such locations than in other areas (Ades &
Glaeser, 1995; Henderson 1999a: Henderson 2003). Addtionally, they have an incentive to
increase living standards where they live, so that they can drcectly benefit from these
investments (Henderson 2004a). The combinatton of underpricing of negative externalities,
information and incentive structure asymmetries induces decision-makers to have a
preference for locating their private or public economic activity in the larger cities in which

they live in. Hence, there is a discrepancy betweenperceived dlseconornies of agglomerationZ
and real lseconomies of agglomeration, such that:
Perceived DA, < DAA
Since lseconomies of agglomeration are much greater in very populated areas than
in less populated areas, there is a bias towards excessive population concentration in large
urban areas, whch prevents cities from achieving efficient sizes. In the following set of
graphs we can observe the previously lscussed determination of optimal city size as well as
the problem of overconcentration.

F i ~ u r e2: The Problem of Excessive Concentration

2 Perceived diseconomies of agglomeration is simply one way to model the different forces that lead
to excessive concentration, not a literal description of the problem. In reality, there are other factors
that also lead to overconcentration, such as the coordination failure problem, that is, workers and
firms are too small to start new cities, and so they all cluster in existing locations.

2.4. Spatial Deoendencv: The Imoact of ITCI
Since there is a systematic trend towards excessive population concentration in large
cities, which causes large productivity losses (Henderson 1999; Henderson, 2003), fmQng
effective policies to reduce this problem has become a central question in the economics
geography literature. The consensus in the urban economics literature is that the key policy
instrument to reduce the problem of excessive concentration is intercity transportation and
communications infrastructure. However, in order to understand why that is the case, first it
is important to explain how ITCI can affect the concentration of cities.
In order to make the model I have been developing more realistic, it is very
important to incorporate the concept of ~patialdependmy. Spatial dependency is the idea that
any given location's absolute economies of agglomeration is also dependant on its position
with respect to all other locations. Hence, for example, if a small city is close to a very
populated area, its economies of agglomeration are sull very hgh, as economic agents have
very low intercity transportation costs to an area where there is h g h density. Sirmlarly, even
if a particular city has a large population, if it is very far away from a group of other large
cities that are closer to each other, its economies of agglomeration may not be as h g h as that
of those other cities. Hence, we can redefine economies of agglomeration for a given city A
as the sum of its population N, and the population of other locations nT,,N,, N,], N, etc.
divided by the intercity transportation ITC costs to each of those locations. However, as I
mentioned earlier, for simplifying purposes, I consider a country composed of only two
cities A and B. Hence, a city A economies of agglomeration is gven by:

S d a r l y , the economies of agglomeration for city B is given by:

It is important to note that, for obvious reasons, the intercity transportation costs between
cities A and B are equal regardless of the direction, such that ITCAB=ITCBA.The intercity
transportation costs between two cities A and B increase as a function of &stance dAB,and
decrease with intercity transportation and communications infrastructure ITCIA,, such that:

ITC,

dAB
ITCIA,

=-

Since ITCI can only reduce the intercity transportation costs generated by distance in the
f ~ splace,
t
the value of dABfor two locations wdl always be greater than their corresponhg
ITCI,,, hence ITC,, wdl always be greater than one. Mathematically:

d, > ITCI,
ITC, > 1

(22)

Since the effect of increasing ITCI is to reduce the intercity transportation costs ITC, ITCI
also increases indtrectly the economies of agglomeration of the connected locations, because
economic agents in both cities now have lower intercity transportation costs to each other
markets. In fact, as the ITC become closer and closer to one due to increasing ITCI, each of
the cities economies of agglomeration grows as though the population in the other location
was part of the city's own population. Because of that, reducing intercity transportation costs
through ITCI has a s d a r effect as bringmg the cities closer into space.
One more aspect that is worth mentioning is that I assume that there is no spatial
dependency for &seconomies of agglomeration. This is a fairly realistic assumption, as for a

given city, increases in population in other cities or towns should not increase its congestion
or rental costs of that city, except when the two cities are very close or right next to each
other. That is perhaps the key advantage of linkmg cities through ITCI, that, unhke
population growth in cities, it increases the economies of agglomeration without increasing
the Qseconomies of agglomeration.

2.5. Asymmetric Returns of ITCI: The Dispersion Effect
Numerous econometric stuQes find evidence for what I call in &IS paper the dipersion
effect, that is, the transfer of economic activity and population that occurs when a large city is
connected through ITCI with a smaller city (Wdhamson, 1965; Wheaton & Shishdo, 1981;
Henderson 1999a; Henderson, 2003). The reason is conceptually straightforward: connecting
two cities through transportation and communication channels makes a smaller connected
city B more competitive, as economic agents in that location have more equal access to the
greater market of the larger city A. In other words, although the absolute economies of
agglomeration of

cities increase, the relative economies of agglomeration of the larger

city A falls, because a reduction in intercity transportation costs between the two cities
benefits the smaller city B to a greater extent than it benefits city A. This makes sense: a
reduction in transportation cost to a larger market is more beneficial than an equivalent
reduction in transportation costs to a smaller market. As a result, for two cities of dfferent
sizes, an equal reduction in transportation costs between them produces asymmetric returns.
Using the model I proposed, the relationship is mathematically unambiguous:

The effect of a better transportation or communications infrastructure between two
locations is to decrease intercity transportation costs by the same amount, such that:

f ITCI,

J ITC,,

-+

f FcIBA
AITC,

lITC,

(24)

+

=

AITC,

(25)

However, a reduction in intercity transportation costs to a larger city increases economies of
agglomeration by more than an equivalent reduction in intercity transportation costs to a
smaller city. As before, the economies of agglomeration of cities A and B are gven by:

( N
EA, =6,(a

J. ITC,

= J.

ITC,

NQ
z + l \

+

AEA, < AEA,

NEA, - NEA, < 0 + NEA, < 0

(27)
(28)

As these mathematical relationshps show, h k m g a large city A with a smaller city B makes
the relative economies of agglomeration of city A fall, because the absolute economies of
agglomeration of city B increase by more than the absolute economies of agglomeration of
city A. The result of thls is that the relative economies of agglomeration and its perceived
&seconomies of agglomeration cross at a lower point, thus leading to a more efficient level
s
can be observed in the
of concentration and reducing productivity loses. T h ~ phenomenon
following graph, in whlch we move from a point b of large productivity loses to a point c, at
which productivity loses are substantially reduced.

Figure 3: The Dis~ersionEffect of ITCI

2.6. The Concentration Effect of ITCI
In addtion to a dspersion effect, I hypothesize that intercity transportation and
communication infrastructure also produces a concentration effect. It is important to clarify
that h s effect does not refer to the gain in population by a smaller connected city B from
the larger city A it is connected to. That is simply the kspersion effect considered from the
perspective of location B. I refer to such phenomenon as the dispersion effect regardless of
whether it is considered from the perspective of location A or B because both cases describe
the same event of a transfer in population from a more populated location to a smaller one.

The dspersion effect thus only involves redstribution of the population amongst
locations connected by ITCI. Conversely, the concentration effect involves a net gain in
population of connected locations relative to unconnected ones. T h s effect, which previous
research had not identified, occurs because economic agents in both A and B, by reducing
their transportation costs to each other's markets, increase their relative economies of
agglomeration with respect to other unconnected locations C. The main reason why some
cities do not get connected or get worse connections through ITCI is economies of scale
(Wdhamson, 1965; Wheaton & Shtshtdo, 1981; Krugman, 1996, Henderson, 2004a;
Henderson2004b). The large costs involved in large infrastructure projects means that such
investments become more profitable as the size of the connected locations increase. Thus,
the comparatively greater connection and access to markets of locations A or B increase
incentives for economic agents in C to locate in one of those larger locations. We can
observe thls result mathematically:
First, we assume that 6, > 6 , > 6 , so that N, >N, > N ,
For a location C, intercity transportation costs to A and B have not changed: Hence:
ITCcA(t

+ 1) = ITCcA(t
=

rcCB(t+l)

)

ITCCB(t)

(29)
(30)

Hence, the absolute economies of agglomeration of city C have also not changed:
EA,(t+,)

=

EAC(t)

(31)

However, as I explained earlier, the improvement of the connection between city A and city

B through ITCI,, increased the absolute economies of agglomeration of both city A and B.
As a result, both the relative economies of agglomeration of cities A and B increase relative
to that of C.For cities A and C:

S d a r l y , for cities B and C:

4 ITC,

-S

AEABc > AEAcB

Hence, in addtion to the lspersion effect, ITCI makes the locations it connects A and B
relatively more competitive than the locations it does not connect. T h s , in turn, produces
population concentration from the unconnected locations C into the connected locations A
and B. This can be observed in the following graph:

Fimre 4: The Concentration Effect of ITCI

As the graph shows, if we consider both the Qspersion and concentration effects,
economies of agglomeration of location A shfts up somewhat and it intersects its perceived
Qseconomies of agglomeration at a hgher point than estimated by just considering the
Qspersion effect. As a result, when we consider the impact of both effects, the loss in
concentration and congestion will be smaller than preQcted by only taking into account the
decentralizing effects of ITCI. This is shown in the Qscrepancy between points d and c. Since
for the largest city A, the Qspersion and concentration effects have opposite duections
(unhke in the case of city B), whether the population in the largest city increases or decreases
depends on the relative m a p t u d e of the Qspersion DE and concentration effects CE.
Thus, for city A:

However, regardless of the relative m a p t u d e s of the Qspersion and concentration effects, it
is certainly true that:

DE+CE>DE

(38)

Hence, calculations that only consider the dspersion effect d overstate the reduction in
congestion and increase in profits by the m a p t u d e of the concentration effect.

2.7. The Guiding Equation
I construct my guidmg equation based on the theory about the determinants of
concentration dscussed above. Such determinants are the Qstribution of natural resources,
the percentage of the economy devoted to manufacturing and services, ITCI and resource
centralization or urban bias. In addtion, since previous literature Qscusses that a certain

level of income is required to invest in infrastructure in the first place, I also include GDP
per capita in the equation. Thus the guiding equation is the following:

PopulationConcentration = a + P,NR + P,Sector

+ P,TC + P,GDPpc + P,RC + &

(39)

where NR refers to natural resources, Sector stands for the manufacturing and services' share
of GDP, TC refers to transportation and communica~onchannels, GDPpc stands for
income per capita and RC refers to resource centralization. The main variable of interest in
h s paper is transportation and communication channels TC, as this study's goal is to
examine its effectiveness as a policy instrument for reducing concentration. Based on the
theory hscussed above, I predict that the sign of the coefficient on ITCI wdl depend on the
measure of concentration used. Specifically, when using primacy, the coefficient on
transportation and communication channels should be negative, as there is a dispersion
effect from larger locations to smaller connected locations. T h s is also the result that studies
using such measure of concentration find. However, if the measure of concentration is
urbanization, the coefficient of transportation and communications channels should be
positive, thus showing the concentration effect from less well connected areas to connected
ones.
With respect to the other independent variables, I expect a negative coefficient for
the lstribution of natural resources when using primacy, as the concentration of economic
activity in one location becomes less efficient as resources are spread. However, the expected
sign of the coefficient for thts variable when using urbanization is ambiguous. Indeed, a
moderate degree of resource decentralization allows for economic activity to be located in
various efficient sized clusters, thus allowing for greater urbanization than if all resources
were in one inefficiently large location. At the same time, when resources are widely
hspersed, urbanization should declme. Economic activity in manufacturing and services is

much more efficient in close spatial proximity, hence I expect a positive coefficient for
urbanization.
The effect of manufacturing and services on primacy will depend on the stage of
urbanization. Based on Wdhamson (1965) hypothesis, at initial stages of the sectoral shft,
when countries lack resources to invest in multiple urban locations, primacy should increase.
However, at later stages of the sectoral shft, when countries can invest in multiple urban
locations, the largest city's share of urban population should decline a greater proportion of
the population moves to urban areas. T h s hypothesis also assumes a strong association
between sectoral specialization and income per capita, whch many stuQes find support for
(Davis and Henderson, 2003). As a result, it is lrkely that these two variables may be
c o h e a r . Finally, I hypothesize resource centralization or urban bias d increase both
primacy and urbanization, as concentration of resources in large locations should make less
populated areas relatively less competitive.

4. Data & Summary Statistics
In order to empirically test the concentration and hspersion effects, I created a panel
dataset that includes 70 countxies and coverage for the period between 1960-2009 every 5
years, using most of the same variables that Henderson (1999a) used for h s research. As I
mentioned earlier, the main Qfference is that I use two measures of population
concentration, primacy and urbanization, as my dependent variables. Both variables are
widely used in the urban economics literature but only primacy has been used for studylng
the effect of policies on excessive concentration. The reason for such choice is that
productivity losses are caused by whether particular locations have excessive concentration,
as opposed to the degree of urbanized population (Henderson 1999a; Henderson, 2003;
Henderson 2004b). The purpose of using the urbanization variable is thus only to test

whether transportation infrastructure produces concentration from less populated areas into
more populated ones. If interregional transportation infrastructure really has a drspersion
effect, it should be present regardless of the measure of population concentration. T h s
concentration effect is directly relevant to the form that urbanization takes, whch is the
aspect that affects economic growth rates (Henderson 1999a; Henderson, 2003). I obtained
the data for these variables from the World Development Inkcators.
In order to measure ITCI, I obtained panel data for roads and railways (in krn) from
World Development Indrcators and faed telephone h e s (per 100 people) data from the
International Telecommunications Union. The WDI road and railway data only covers the
period from 1980 to 2010, but I was able to obtain adktional road data from 1963-1979
from the International Road Federation. Both sources used the same defmition and
measurement for roads, so I merged the data I had for both time periods to create a dataset
with coverage from 1963-2010. Another transformation I k d to the road and rdway data is
to standardrze them to a common scale to control for country size, by drviding them by the
land area of their respective countries, as Henderson (1999,2003) k d in h s study. I obtained
such land area data from the CIA World Factbook. In order to account for natural types of
transportation channels that have a s d a r function as ITCI, I obtained data for waterways
(in krn), also from the CIA World Factbook. As with roads and railways, I then transformed
the data to waterways density by Qvidmg the variable by land area. I also use the land area
data to measure the dstribution of natural resources, as prior research indicates that as land
area increases natural resources become more scattered, thus promoting population
Qspersion (Rappaport and Sacks, 2001).
With respect to sectoral specialization, I obtained data for agriculture's percentage
share of GDP from the World Development Indcators and then transformed t h ~ sdata to

the manufacturing and services' share of economic activity by subtracting the data to one
hundred. The data I collected for real GDP per capita (in dollars) comes from the World
Development Indcators as well, and I transformed the data to reflect income in thousands
of dollars, whch is much more informative than individual dollars. In order to measure
resource centralization or urban bias, I obtained data for the share of central government
consumption and openness to trade from the Penn World Tables. The h k between
concentration and openness is not evident. The economic geography literature suggests that
greater trade increases incentives for policymakers to pursue efficient allocation of resources,
as there is a threat that international producers might move to other countries (Henderson,
2004a). Addtionally, I constructed a dummy variable for whether the largest city is the
capital, by comparing data for countries largest cities and countries capitals from Nation
Master.
Prior to computing the summary statistics for these variables, I used several methods
to clean the data, such as removing any former countries (e.g. Czechoslovaha, East
Germany etc.), regons or areas that are not countries (e.g. high income countries, European
Union, Atlantic Ocean etc.) as well as countries that had data with impossible ratios, such as
having more than 100°/o of urbanization, primacy, central government share of consumption,
manufacturing and services share of GDP, or fmed telephone lmes per 100 people. In total,
there were 175 geographc areas that fulfilled one of these criteria and were removed from
the dataset. Before these changes were made, the variables that used ratios had lstributions
that were hghly skewed to the right. After the data was cleaned, all the ratio variables had
very symmetrical normal dstributions. Excludmg geographc areas also had the effect of
reducing the size of the dataset and hence the number of observations. However, I was able
to gain many observations by giving uniform labels to countries that had been named

dfferently by dfferent data sources. In total, there were about 50 countries that had been
given dfferent names by the lfferent data sources, and some cases countries had numerous
lfferent names, as in the case of South Korea.
In computing the descriptive statistics, I disaggregated the data into time and crosscountry variation, in order to show how much of the panel variation occurs in each of those
two dunensions. Table 1 includes the total variation of the data, and Tables 2 and 3 show the
cross-country and time variation of the data, respectively. All three tables are in arithmetic
scale, as they are much more informative in such format than in logarithmic scale.
Nonetheless, I included a table with values in logarithmic scale, in order to be able to
compare values with prevlous studies. I contrasted the values in logs I obtained with that of
Henderson (1999a) study, and overall the variables have very slmdar means and standard
deviations, in spite of the fact that the study covers a greater time period (1960-2010, as
opposed to 1960-1995). The dummy variable for whether the largest city is the capital was
not included in any of the summary statistics tables, and the country invariant variables such
as waterways and land area of countries were not included in the time-series table. The most
s t r h g aspect common to all tables using the arithmetic scale is the enormous dfference in
unit scale across variables, for example rail density ranges between 0 and 0.12, whereas land
area ranges between 2 and 27400000. When the data is transformed to logs these dfferences
in scale are largely reduced, however, there are stdl important dfferences in range of
variation amongst the independent variables. For example, the standard deviation of land
area is 3.02 percentage points, more than twelve times than that of manufacturing and
services share of GDP, wlvch is only 0.22 percentage points. By comparing the values in
tables 2 and 3 we can also observe that the variation in the data IS much greater across

countries than across time, which is consistent with the lack of large dfferences between the
descriptive statistics in h s study and Henderson's (1999a).
Nevertheless, time variation has the advantage that it provides information about
how all independent variables affect the evolution of the concentration measures. I show the
change over time in population concentration, measured in primacy and urbanization, in
Figure 5. The comparison of the urbanization and primacy trends reveals a s t r h g fact:
although the average largest city's share of urban population has been consistently deching,
the share of the population concentration in urban areas has been consistently rising.
Moreover, the increase in the concentration in urban areas has a substantially steeper slope
than the decrease in concentration in the largest city. In fact, the figure shows that the
average level of urbanization across countries crosses the 50°/o benchmark around the early
1990s. It is important to dstinguish h s measure from world urbanization, whch considers
the percentage of the total world's population living in urban areas. Accordmg to the United
Nations (2007) world urbanization surpassed the 50% benchmark in 2006, about 15 years
later than the urbanization cross-country average. This discrepancy suggests that less
populated countries are more urbanized, as their impact is small on total world urbanization
and large on the cross-country average, whch gves equal weight to small and large
countries.
Figures 6 and 7 show the relationshp between road density and primacy and
urbanization, respectively. The variables are shown in logarithmic scale, as the range of
variation in road density is so narrow that plotting the variable in arithmetic scale would
crowd together the data. As the graphs show, the strength of these correlations is modest in
both cases, -0.12 in the case of road density and primacy and 0.36 in the case of road density
and urbanization. However, the most remarkable aspect is that the correlations of the

concentration measures and road density have opposite signs. T h s discrepancy is shown
more clearly in Figure 8. These correlations are consistent with the theoretical prediction that
ITCI produces population hspersion amongst connected locations and population
concentration from the unconnected areas into the connected ateas. However, since the
figure only shows a correlation, it is possible that these hffering trends are explained by the
influence of other factors. I explore h s question in the following section.

5. Analysis
5.1. Estimation Issues & Estimation Equation
In order to be consistent with previous literature, I use road density as my measure
of intercity transportation infrastructure. However, there is an endogeneity problem in using
such variable, as roads are highly concentrated in urban areas. In other words, roads are both
a type of inter and intra city transportation infrastructure. Since urban growth and intra-city
transportation infrastructure are positively correlated, the causality relationshp between
urban concentration and transportation infrastructure occurs in both hections. Henderson
(1999a) acknowledges this problem and deals with it by includmg urbanization as an
independent variable in the primacy regression, as an instrumental variable for intracity road
investments. However, such technique does not seem ideal. The best way to deal with thts
problem would be to have variables that disaggregated data for inter and intra city public
capital. Since no such data is available, railway density seems to be a good option to measure

ITCI, since radways are primarily used for intercity transportation purposes, whereas roads
are largely used for both inter and intra city functions. I wdl explore thls possibhty in a
robustness check.

I computed the pairwise correlations amongst the independent variables to test for
multicollinearity. I report these values on Table 5. There is very h g h cohearity between all

the public capital variables, especially between road and railway density, which is over 3 0 .
This suggests that countries make investments in different types of public capital
simultaneously. As a result, any of these variables may be used to measure public capital, and
when used they should be regressed separately, not together. Income per capita and the
GDP share of manufacturing and services have a very h g h positive correlation of 0.77. This
is to be expected, as it is widely documented in the economic development literature that
production in manufacturing and services activities is far greater than that of agricultural
activities. GDP per capita also has a high level of cohearity with all the public capital
variables, especially fured telephone h e s , whch is almost 0.90. As a result of this high
colhearity with both the public capital variables and sectoral specialization in manufacturing
and services, I decided to drop the variable from the regression. Specialization in
manufacturing and services has a very strong theoretical justification as a determinant of
economies of agglomeration; hence I had to maintain that variable in the regression. The
theoretical justification for income per capita is, however, primarily h t e d to the effect of
growth in investments in public capital, whch I include in the regression. There are no
strong theoretical reasons to believe that growth in other ktnds of economic activity (e.g. the
human genome project) have sipficant effects on urban concentration.

I tested for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using the Wooldridge and Wald
tests, respectively, and in both cases I obtained significant results. Both of these results are
not surprising. Significant heteroskedasticity may have been produced by the inclusion of
numerous countries with very different sizes, as shown in the large standard deviations of
land area and urban population. Variations in small countries should be much greater than
variations in large countries, as any small change in a given variable is relatively much greater
in a small country than in a large country. Serial correlation may be due to the fact that I

lagged all the policy variables (road density, central government consumption and openness),
by one period, that is five years. This is also the approach used in Henderson's (1999a, 2003)
research, and the theoretical justification for such choice is that the effect of policy decisions
is not immediate. Since no further research has been conducted on the exact lag of these
effects, a one period lag (5 years) is used as a default. I corrected these estimation problems
of significant heteroskedasticity and serial correlation by using robust standard errors in my
regressions. Besides these issues, I checked for unit roots by using the Fisher test, but found
no significant evidence for non-stationary. Finally, I decided to use a double-log form for my
estimation equations, both for consistency with previous literature and because it spreads the
data of variables that have a narrow range of variation, such as the public capital variables.
Therefore, I express my estimation equations for primacy and urbanization as follows:
Log PRIMACY), = a+PlLog(RD)(, + P,Log(SECTOR), + P,Log(GOV)(t-l)l+ P,Log(OP)(t,)I

I)+

P , L o g W ) , + P,Log(LA), +

P, (CAPITAL), + B,Log(URB), + e,

(40)

Log (URBANIZATION), = a+p,Log(RD)(,,), + B,Log(SECTOR), + p,Log(GOV)(,.,,, +
P,Log(OP)')(,I,, + P,LogOXrD), + P,Log(LA), + B, (CAPITAL), + el

(41)

where RD is road density, SECTOR is the percentage of GDP that is devoted to
manufacturing and services, GOV is central government consumption, OP is openness to
trade, WD is waterway density, LA is stand for land area3,and CAPITAL is the dummy
variable for whether the country's largest city is the capital.

5.2. Main Results

I specified the country invariants waterway density and land area, as opposed to running the
regression with fixed effects. This is because there are many country invariants, whlch do not explain
urban concentration, hence running the regression with fixed effects drops the adjusted R-squares.

I present my results in terms of the percentage change of one standard deviation of
the dependent variable per one standard deviation increase in each independent variable in
Table 64.This is the technique that Henderson (1999a) uses to interpret results, which is an
essential element to control for Qfferent ranges of variation of the variables. For example, a
one percent increase in a variable such as GDP share of manufacturing and services is
equivalent to increasing it by more than four standard deviations. However, a one percent
increase in land area would be an increase of less than a thud of its standard deviation.
Hence, the raw coefficients overstate the impact of variables with low standard deviations
and understate the effect of factors with large ones. Nevertheless, I included the raw
coefficients in Table 10 in the appendm section.
The effect of road density on primacy is in h e with the theoretical preQction and
consistent with previous literature. Increasing road density by one standard deviation reduces
primacy by almost 13%, very slrmlar to what Henderson (1999a) found5 . The p-value is
0.059, thus thls result is statistically sipficant at the 10% level. However, an even more
significant result is the effect of road density on urbanization, which is positive and
statistically sipficant at the 1% level. Increasing road density by one standard deviation
increases population in urban areas by 15% of a standard deviation in urbanization6.Ths
result is not only consistent with the theoretical prediction of a concentration effect, but in
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The adjusted coefficients were obtained with the formula

% A a y = pxk/ [(I / aXk
) * 10011 0, ,

where a refers to the standard deviation, xk to a given independent variable k,y to the dependent
variable and

pXKis the raw coefficient of variable xk.

Henderson (1999a) found that a one standard deviation increase in road density reduces primacy by
10% of its standard deviation.
6 The samples in the urbanization and primacy regressions are not exactly equal, since t h s type of
macro level data tends to be very unbalanced. As happens with previous panel data studies
(Henderson, 1999), this leads us to be cautious in comparing coefficients across regressions.
However, this seems to be a better option than making all samples exactly equal, as that would result
in the loss of a substantial amount of observations.
5

fact suggests that such concentration effect in cities is stronger than the hspersion effect
from the primate city to other urban areas. If investments in ITCI only had the effect of
maktng hmterland locations more competitive, as the urban economics literature suggests,
the effect of roads should be to reduce urbanization. The results provided here suggest
otherwise and are consistent with the idea that ITCI has the effect of inducing population
concentration into the locations it connects from the locations it does not connect. Small
locations, such as rural areas, often lack economies of scale to make investments in public
capital cost-effective and are thus often not connected or connected by less expensive types
of infrastructure. Hence, when better public capital is located elsewhere, the incentive for
economic agents to move to that area increases.
The coefficients of other variables are generally in h e with theoretical prehctions.
Waterway density, as road density, strongly reduces primacy, about 26% of its standard
deviation, and the effect is significant at the 5% level. This makes sense: theoretically,
waterways should have a s d a r effect to that of ITCI of fachtating transportation and
communication, thus promoting population hspersion. However, it is noteworthy that
waterways, unlike public capital, do not seem to promote significant concentration in urban
areas. Why? A possible explanation is that waterways, unlike public capital, is not
systematically planned to connect locations of a certain size. Both small towns and large
cities can benefit from waterway connections. Thus, there is no reason why denser networks
of rivers, lakes and seas should sipficantly increase urbanization. Land area, another
geography variable, also strongly reduces primacy, as expected. When resources are more
scattered, it becomes more costly to concentrate in a single location. By the same token,
when a country's territory is not very large, and all the resources and land are concentrated in
a small area, the population tends to cluster. As an extreme example to illustrate this point,

in Singapore there is virtually no room for the population to spread outside of the city, hence
the whole population is clustered in the same area. The significantly positive effect of land
area on urbanization is less clear. It is possible that having a very large land area requires
having multiple large cities as centers of hfferent regons, thus reducing primacy and
increasing urbanization. Some examples that would fit t h s explanation are Canada, China
and Australia.
Also in line with expectations, sectoral specialization in manufacturing and services
has a very large positive effect in increasing urbanization, about a 41% increase of its
standard deviation, statistically sigmficant at the 1% level. T h s result is consistent with the
idea that industrial and service activities are much more efficient in high density, where there
are knowledge spdlovers and a large demand nearby. The effect of specialization in
manufacturing and services has a positive but insipficant effect on primacy. As hscussed in
the theory section, the relationshp between sectoral specialrzation and primacy is
ambiguous. It is possible that at initial stages of industriahation, most of the population
clusters in the primate city. However, as the city reaches its peak population and other urban
clusters develop, further industrialization and movement to urban areas reduces the largest
city's share of urban population. In other words, since primacy is a ratio that has the total
urban population as the denominator, if urban population increases in areas other than the
largest city, primacy wdl decrease, even if the population in the largest city does not fall or
grows by a smaller magmtude. For thls reason, the coefficient on urban population is
negative and economically and statistically sigmficant in the primacy regression.
With respect to the variables that measure resource centralization, the effects of
increasing openness to trade is negative for primacy and positive for urbanization, as
expected. However, these coefficients are not statistically or economically sigmficant, as

Henderson (1999a) found. The coefficients for central government consumption have
coefficients with signs contrary to expectations, however, the effects also insipficant. It is
possible that the effect of government centralism is primarily captured by the dummy
variable for whether the primate city is the capital. The effect of being the capital increases
primacy by over 36% of its standard deviation, very s d a r to what Henderson (1999a)
found, however t h s result is not statistically sipficant. T h s effect is, however, economically
and statistically sipficant for urbanization. If the largest city is the capital, urbanization
increases by over 27% of its standard deviation, and the effect is sigmficant at the 5% level.
Indeed, since urbanization includes the population of the largest city, if the population in the
largest city increases the urban population will also increase is part of that growth is driven
from migrants from rural areas.

5.3. Robustness
For the first robustness check, I transformed the population concentration measures
into two new variables, the share of the total population in urban areas other than the
primate city and the largest city's share of the total population7. I then performed regressions
using the same independent variables against these two new measures, which I present in
Table 7 . I begin by Qscussing the regression on secondary urban areas. If the dynamics of
the dispersion and concentration effect really work as theoretically preQcted, the increase in
secondary urban areas should exceed the increase in urbanization. Tlus is because in addition

To obtain these measures, I simply multiplied primacy by urbanization to obtain the population
share of the largest. I then subtracted that number to urbanization to obtain the share of the
population in secondary urban areas, that is, the urbanized share of the population excluding the
primary city.

to the concentration effect from the unconnected rural areas into the connected network of
urban areas, secondary urban areas should also absorb the reduction in the population of the
primate city produced by the Qspersion effect. The results from the robustness check show
exactly that. A one standard deviation increase in road density increases the population share
in secondary urban areas by over 25.62% of its standard deviation, compared to the 15.33%
increase in population share in urban areas, and the effect is sipficant at the 1%level.
Hence, t h s is consistent with the idea that the Qspersion and concentration effects have the
same lrection for connected secondary urban areas.
However, this paper's theory section also predcts that the dispersion and
concentration effects have opposite duections for the largest city. In other words,
theoretically, the largest city loses population with respect to other connected cities and gains
population from unconnected towns or cities. Hence, its reduction of the population should
be smaller with respect to the total population, whlch considers both connected and
unconnected areas than with respect to urban areas, whch only considers connected
locations. The results support this conclusion. A one standard deviation increase in road
density reduces the largest city's share of the total population by 9.59% of its standard
deviation, compared to a 12.73% reduction in a standard deviation of primacy, an the effect
is sipficant at the 10% level. As predicted, the loss in population in the primate city
produced by the kspersion effect is somewhat offset by the increase in population of the
concentration effect. Thus, although the Qspersion effect is dominant, the reduction in
population in the primate city is substantially smaller when both effects are considered. By
t h s measure, only considering the Qspersion effect overstates the reduction in population of
the largest city by about 25%, a substantial Qscrepancy.

For my second robustness check, I used rail density to measure public capital, and
regressed it against all four measures of concentration, I show the results of these regressions
on Table 8. Rad density has the advantage that, unlike roads, it has a primarily intercity
transportation function, and thus reduces the endogeneity associated with including intracity
transportation infrastructure. However, rail density also has the &sadvantage of comprising a
relatively small portion of transportation infrastructure investments compared to roads, and
thus it does not fully capture the variation in ITCI. Because each measure of public capital
has different pros and cons, a comparison of their effects can be very informative. Overall,
the effects of rail density are very consistent with those of road density. As with roads,
railway density reduces primacy and the largest city's population share, and at the same time
increases urbanization and the share of the population of secondary urban areas. However,
there are also some important hfferences. First, rail density shows a much stronger
dspersion effect than roads. Increasing rail density by one standard deviation reduces
primacy by over 28% of a standard deviation of primacy, an effect more that is more than
twice as strong as that observed with roads. The effect is significant at the 1% level. At the
same time, rail density shows a weaker concentration effect, as it increases urbanization by
about 9.27% of its standard deviation, compared to the 15.3356 observed with roads, and the
effect is significant at the 10% level.
However, the most surprising fact is that, contrary to expectations, the increase in
population share produced by railway density is somewhat weaker for secondary urban areas
than in all urban areas. A one standard deviation increase in rail density increases the share
of secondary urban areas by 8.9% of its standard deviation, and the effect is statistically
sipficant at the 10% level. A possible explanation for this result is that the concentration
effect in the largest city is much stronger than that produced in secondary urban areas. This

can occur when the primate city is well connected to other locations but those other
locations are not well connected to each other. An example of such a possibhty is the
Spanish High Speed Rail System, whch connects all the province capitals to Madrid, the
capital city, but does not connect those other cities duectly to each other. For example,
Madrid is connected duectly to both Barcelona and Valencia; the second and third largest
cities of the country, but such cities are not duectly connected to each other (ADIF, 2010) ,
even though they are in closer spatial proximity (CIA World Factbook). If the largest city is
at the center of the transportation infrastructure network, economic agents in that city have
disproportionately better access to other markets, thus inducing a comparatively stronger
concentration effect. The results for the largest city's share of the population support this
proposition. Increasing rail density by one standard deviation reduces the share of the
population of the largest city by 21.37%, about 7 percentage points less than the effect on
primacy. The dfference in results between roads and railways suggests thus might be due to
the dfferent structure of the transportation infrastructure networks. Railways might be
planned as a network with a clearer center, whereas road networks may be more
comprehensive and have a less defined principal dstributor. Thus, different types of ITCI
may favor cities of different sizes to dfferent degrees.
As a final robustness check, I regressed fured telephone h e s , another type of ITCI,
against all four measures of concentration. I show these regression results on Table 9. The
variable is significantly multicolhear with both manufacturing and services share of GDP
and urban population. Thus I dropped urbanization from the primacy and largest city's share
of the population. However, I maintained sectoral specialization in the regression, as it is an
absolutely essential variable. The results are again very consistent with the pattern found in
the regressions using road and railway density as measures of public capital. Increasing fixed

telephone hnes reduces population concentration in the largest city relative to other urban
areas, and at the same time promotes population concentration from rural areas into urban
areas. However, the results of these regressions are overall much stronger than in those
using roads and railways. A one standard deviation increase in fixed telephone lmes reduces
primacy by 23.44% percent of its standard deviation, and increases urbanization by 36.19%
of its standard deviation. Both effects are statistically sipficant at the 1% level.
Nevertheless, the most strllung aspect of these regressions is the fact that fixed
telephone lmes actually increases the largest city share of the total population by about 12%
of its standard deviation. This would mean that for the largest city, the concentration effect
exceeds the Qspersion effect. In other words, the largest city would gain more population
from unconnected rural areas than it would lose to connected urban areas. As a result,
investments made in fixed telephone h e s would exacerbate congestion problems in the
primate city instead of alleviating them. However, there is an important reason why these
results should be interpreted with caution. Fixed telephone h e s , unlike roads and railways,
are measured per 100 people, not in kdometer density. It seems that measuring public capital
by the coverage of network controls better for intracity infrastructure than measuring it in
terms of percentage of the population. Tlvs is because, due to the greater Qstance between
cities than within them, ITCI should have a greater weight on the network density measure
than intracity infrastructure. When this is measured in terms of population, however, such
effect dsappears. As a result, fixed telephone h e s should have a greater endogeneity
problem than the other two variables. Since there are more fuied telephone lmes in more
populated areas than less populated ones, these results hkely overstate the concentration
effect and understate the dispersion effect.

As was the case with roads and railways, &IS discussion shows that each measure of
ITCI has its own h t a t i o n s . Therefore, regression results using of any one of them have to
be interpreted prudently. It is, however, on the comparison of regression results using different
measures of public capital that stronger conclusions can be drawn. And indeed, from such
comparison, there is a clear convergence in some key aspects. First, all regression results
show that public capital produces a sipficant dispersion effect from the largest urban area
to other urban areas, and a sipficant concentration effect from rural areas into urban areas.
Also, regression results using all three measures show that the population share of the largest
city is reduced by less when compared to both connected urban areas and unconnected rural
areas than when compared only to connected urban areas. In addition, the results show that
public capital produces a greater increase in share of the population of secondary urban areas
than in the largest city. T h s supports the theoretical prediction that the dispersion and
concentration effects have the same positive direction for secondary urban areas, whereas
for the largest city the former effect has a negative drrection and the latter a positive one.
The discrepancies of the regression results thus have more to do with the absolute and
relative m a p t u d e s of the concentration and dispersion effects, not with their existence.

6. Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to examine and deepen our understanding of the effect
of ITCI on urban concentration. The question has become of increasing importance in the
economics geography literature, as policymakers seek to frnd solutions to the problem of
excessive urban concentration, whlch occurs systematically across countries (Ades &
Glaeser, 1995; Henderson 1999a, Henderson 2003). The costs of such inefficient population
distribution are severe; as studies find that excessive concentration reduce economic growth
rates sipficantly, up to 1.5 percentage points of GDP (Henderson, 1999a). For the past

four decades, the consensus in urban economics has been that investment in interregonal
transportation and communications infrastructure is the key policy instrument to solve t h s
problem. The reason is clear: ITCI reduces the cost of access to the market of the largest city
for hinterland locations, thus m a h g them more competitive. T h s study also finds support
for such dispersion effect, but points out that only considering such Qstribution
phenomenon is an incomplete explanation for the effect of public capital on the population
concentration.
In a nutshell, the maln contribution of h s study is a simple idea: economic agents in
the largest city also benefit from the lower cost of transportation to the market of a smaller
city. They benefit to a lesser extent than the smaller city to which it has been connected to,
but they benefit nonetheless. Thus, when ITCI connects two locations, they

become

more desirable locations to do business. Because the increase in competitiveness is greater
for the smaller city than the larger city, the relative competitiveness of the larger city falls
with respect to the smaller city, whtch explains the move of firms and workers to the less
populated city. However, the relative competitiveness of both increase with respect to all
unconnected locations. T h s explains why firms and workers move from those unconnected
locations into the connected ones; the concentration effect. I use primacy and urbanization,
two Qfferent measures of population concentration, to capture these effects. The dispersion
effect is best captured with primacy because it compares the share of the largest urban area
to smaller connected urban areas. The concentration effect is best captured with
urbanization because it shows how the effect of public capital Qffers for urban and rural
areas, whch Qffer in economes of scale and hence the cost-effectiveness of investments in
public capital. If investment in public capital only had the effect of promoting Qspersion
from more populated locations to less populated ones, the direction of the effect should be

negative for both measures of concentration. The results of thls paper, however, show
otherwise: investments in ITCI promote dispersion only amongst the locations it connects
and induces concentration from the locations that are left unconnected into the connected
ones. The implication of thls conclusion is a paradoxical one: a reduction in transportation
costs can increase incentives for population concentration. T h s is because it not only
matters whether the costs are reduced; it also matters where they are reduced.
The implications of not talung into account the concentration effect are severe. After
all, if policymakers believe that investments in ITCI only promote population dspersion,
they wdl continue to place such investments where it intuitively make sense: in very
populated areas where there are large economies of scale. If reducing congestion to raise
productivity is one of the goals of the investment, they wdl underacheve or even exacerbate
the problem. Does thls imply that policymakers should not invest in ITCI as much? No.
Instead, takmg the concentration effect into account means that investments in public capital
need to connect a sufficient number of locations for the dispersion effect to be sigmficantly
greater than the concentration effect. Indeed, in the extreme example of a public capital
network in whch all locations were connected, there would be no concentration effect.
However, that would not be desirable, as some level of concentration sigmficantly increases
productivity (Henderson 1999a, Henderson 2003). Hence, depending on whether
policymakers want to encourage or discourage concentration in a set of locations, they
should connect more or fewer locations. Since the research in the urban economics literature
documents that the problem tends to be excessive concentration, in general, policymakers
should plan to connect more locations with public capital than they currently are. This is a
relevant policy recommendation to current policy proposals, such as President Obama's
proposed hgh-speed rail network in the United States, whch, not surprisingly, only connects

the largest cities of broad land areas (US Department of Transportation, 2010).
This paper also raises a set of new important questions for future research. For
example, h s paper uses urban areas as the group of locations with h g h economies of scale
and rural areas as the group of locations with low economies of scale. Such categorization is
useful as an approximation, but there may be a better way to separate well-connected areas
from less well-connected ones. This is especially true for case studes, in whch there may be
more accurate data about the location of investments in public capital. Furthermore, the
broad classification in itself of a network of connected locations may be further explored. As
was mentioned in the robustness results using railway density, there may be drfferent types
and structures of public capital networks that affect cities dfferently. Some types of ITCI
networks may connect all locations fairly evenly, whereas others may provide an asymmetric
number of connections to a city or a set of cities. Hence, it may not only matter whether a
city is connected to a public capital network, but also its position in the network. For
example, a city hke Paris, France, which is surrounded by a number of populated areas, may
benefit more from its fairly central position in the network than a city like Berlin, whch is on
a more peripheral region of Europe.
Finally, the fact that a city's productivity depend in part of how it coordmates its
connections with other cities raises an even deeper theoretical question related to game
theory. For example, policymakers in a given city may want to push for public capital
connections with more populated locations, in order to attract some of that economic
activity into their city. However, the governments of larger cities may want to avoid such
connections or only pursue them when the concentration effect exceeds the dspersion
effect, in order to not lose economic activity. In addition, governments of drfferent cities
may decide to connect their cities to increase their relative competitiveness with respect to

cities in other regions. Since the prosperity in cities and regons depends in their
coordmation with policymakers in other areas, there wdl be confltcts of interest. Thus,
policymakers in lfferent areas will have to come to agreements so that mutually beneficial
investments in ITCI are made.

Variable
Primacy
Urbanization
Rail density
Road density
Fixed telephone lines
GDP per capita

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Manufactwing
& services share of GDP
Government
Openness
Waterway density
Land area

Variable
Primacy
Urbanization
Rail density
Road density
Fixed telephone lines
GDP per capita
Manufacturing
& services share of GDP
Government
Openness
Waterway density
Land area

Observations
1144

Mean
28.64

Std. Dev.
13.85

Min
3.47

Max
61.98

1549
1549
957
1735

58.95
73.78
0.02
1625596

14.38
37.54
0.03
4555919

10.01
4.28
0.00
2

88.61
207.74
0.18
27300000

Table 3 - Summarv Statistics - Time Variation
Variable
Primacy
Urbanization
Rail density
Road density
Fixed telephone lines
GDP per capita
Manufacturing
& services share of GDP
Government
O~enness

Observations
1749
1749
1048
1575
1749
1749

Mean

Std. Dev.
0.92
6.53
0.00
0.22
5.73
20.90

Min
30.04

Max
32.67

Table 4 - Total Variation (Logs)
Variable
Log primacy
Log urban concentration
Log road density
Log rail density
Log lixed telephone lines
Log GDPpc
Log manufacturing
& services share
Log government
Log openness
Log waterways
Log land area

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

946
1205
1205
688
1291

4.39
4.03
4.03
-5.09
11.72

0.22
0.36
0.73
1.40
3.02

3.21
1.27
0.68
-9.98
0.69

4.60
4.60
5.68
-1.69
17.13
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Table 5 - Painvise Correlations
Log
road density
Log road
density
Log rail
density
Log FTL
Log GDPpc
Log
government
Log openness
Log waterways
Log land area

Log
rail density

Log
FTL

Log
GDPpc

0.8263
0.6288
0.5514

1
0.5764
0.5106

1
0.8698

1

0.044
-0.0157
0.2397
-0.5111

-0.1428
0.0576
0.2653
-0.5762

-0.226
0.1817
0.142
-0.2489

-0.4143
0.1724
0.1613
-0.2508

Log
government

Log
Log
openness waterways

Log
land area

1

1
-0.2381
-0.1172
0.0795

1
0.1223
-0.4646

1
-0.332

1

Table 6 - Main Results - Adiusted Coefficients
Variable
Log road density (t-1)

Log primacy
-12.728
(1390)

Log urbanization
15.333
(3.56)""

0.28
310
64

0.59
351
81

Log manufacturing
& services GDP share
Log share of central
government consumption (t-1)
Log openness (t-1)
Log waterway density
Log land area
Capital city dummy variable
(1 if largest city is the capital)
Log national urban population
R-squared
Observations
Number of group (country)
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses

* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Variable
Log road density (t-1)

Log secondary
urban areas
25.624
(5.84)**

Log largest city
population share
-9.586
(1.890)

0.64
310
64

(8.26)**
0.41
310
64

Log manufacturing
& services GDP share
Log share of central
government consumption (t-1)
Log openness (t-1)
Log waterway density
Log land area
Capital city dummy variable
(1 if largest city is the capital)

R-squared
Observations
Number of group (country)
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses

* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 8 - Robustness Check 2- Adiusted Coefficients
Variable
Log rail density (t-1)
Log manufacturing
& services GDP share
Log share of central
government consumption (t-1)
Log openness (t-1)
Log waterway density
Log land area
Capital city dummy variable
(1 if largest city is the capital)
Log national urban population

I%
primacy
-28.380
(2.95)**

Log
urbanization
9.273
(1.740)

Log secondary
urban areas
8.935
(1.680)

Log largest city
population share
-21.373
(2.95)""

-7.627
(1.780)

13.564
(4.84)**

17.121
(5.57)**

-5.744
(1.780)

7.326
(1.450)
4.029
(1.520)
-30.629
(2.49)*
-98.847
(3.42)**

-5.130
(1.700)
5.331
(2.56)*
1.342
(0.220)
28.386
(2.17)*

-15.015
(4.07)**
4.505
(2.32)"
6.033
(1.110)
27.105
(1.99)*

5.518
(1.450)
3.034
(1.520)
-23.068
(2.49)"
-74.444
(3.42)**

69.856
(2.25)*
-73.013

36.817
(2.53)*

-3.035
(0.220)

52.610
(2.25)"
24.360

229
61

205
53

310
64

Observations
205
Number of group (country)
53
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 9 - Robustness Check 3 - Adjusted Coefficients
Variable
Log fixed telephone h e s (t-1)

Log
primacy
-23.440
(6.58)""

<

Log
urbanization
36.190
(15.37)**

Log secondary
urban areas
34.600
(14.63)""

Log largest city
population share
12.004
(3.84)""

510
84

430
67

430
67

Log manufacturing &
services GDP share
Log share of central
government consumption (t-1)
Log openness (t-1)
Log waterway density
Log land area

-7.687
(2.45)"
5.616
(2.10)"
-30.394
(2.72)""
-76.036
(3.10)""

Capital city dummy variable
(1 if largest city is the capital)

Observations
Number of group (country)
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in
parentheses
* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

430
67

Table 10 - Main Results - Raw Coefficients
Variable
Log road density (t-1)

Log primacy
-0.052

Log urbanization
0.066

310
64

351
81

Log manufacturing
& services GDP share
Log share of central
government consumption (t-1)
Log openness (t-1)
Log waterway density
Log land area
Capital city dummy variable
(1 if largest city is the capital)
Log national urban population
Constant

Observations
Number of group (country)
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* sipficant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 11 - Robustness Check 1 - Raw Coefficients
Variable
Log road density (t-1)

Log secondary
urban areas
0.139

Log largest city
population share
-0.052

0.64
310
64

0.41
310
64

Log manufacturing &
services GDP share
Log share of central
government consumption (t-1)
Log openness (t-1)
Log waterway density
Log land area
Capital city dummy variable
(1 if largest city is the capital)
Constant

R-squared
Observations
Number of group (country)
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 12 - Robustness Check 2 - Raw Coefficients
Variable
Log rail density (t-1)

LC%
primacy
-0.122
(2.95)**

Log
urbanization
0.042
(1.74)

Log secondary
urban areas
0.051
(1.68)

Log largest city
population share
-0.122
(2.95)**

(3.34)**
0.30
229
61

(2.16)*
0.45
205
53

(2.48)*
0.27
205
53

Log manufacturing
& services GDP share

Log share of central
government consumption (t-1)
Log openness (t-1)
Log waterway density
Log land area
Capital city dummy variable
(1 if largest city is the capital)
Log national urban population
Constant
(6.89)**
R-squared
0.29
Observations
205
Number of group (country)
53
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 13 - Robustness Check 3 - Raw Coefficients
Variable
Log fixed telephone h e s (t-1)

urbanization
0.122
(15.37)""

urban areas
0.147
(14.63)""

populatton share

0.244

0.072

-0.078

0.287

(1.48)
5.346

(1.12)
1.143

(0.98)
-0.46

(1.53)
1.74

67

84

67

67

primacy
-0.075
(6.58)""

Log manufacturing & services
GDP share

-0.147

Log share of central
government consumption (t-1)

-0.128

Log openness (t-1)
Log waterway density
Log land area
Capital city dummy variable
(1 if largest city is the capital)
Constant

Observations
Number of group (country)

(2.45)"
0.046
(2.10)"
-0.129
(2.72)""
-0.15
(3.10)""

Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

0.051
(3.84)""
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